Using the UK Citizenship Survey for the years 2007-2010, this paper investigates how immigrants view immigration and how these views compare to the views of natives. Immigrants who have been in the UK longer are similar to natives in being opposed to further immigration, while recent immigrants are more in favour of further immigration. Labour market concerns do not play a large role for either immigrants or natives. However, there is some evidence that financial and economic shocks can increase anti-immigration sentiments.
Introduction
Questions of immigration policy and opinions on immigration in general have recently taken centre stage in various political decisions, such as the referendum vote in the UK to leave the European Union or the ultimately successful run for the US presidency by Donald Trump. This paper considers the views of immigrants and natives towards further immigration as well as their determinants.
Most of the literature concerned with support for, or opposition to, immigration has focused on natives, while the views of immigrants already in a host country have received less attention.
1 There are, however, marked differences between natives and immigrants: According to the UK Citizenship Survey (Department for Communities and Local Government and Ipsos MORI 2007-2010) around 71 % of respondents are opposed to further immigration.
2 Unsurprisingly, this number increases to 83 % of all natives, but even among immigrants almost 50 % oppose further immigration. However, immigrants are themselves not homogeneous, for example in terms of the time they have already spent in a country and their degree of integration into their host country's culture. To capture this heterogeneity, we consider two groups of immigrants: those who have been in the country for 5 years or more (earlier immigrants) and those who have been in the country for fewer than 5 years (recent immigrants). Among the former 53 % of respondents are opposed to further immigration, while only 33 % of recent immigrants oppose further immigration, already illustrating the importance of the aforementioned heterogeneity.
In this paper, we investigate these differences in attitudes towards immigration. 3 Our results show that immigrants who have been in the country for five years or more have views on immigration that are similar to those of natives, i. e., they are more likely to oppose further immigration than recent immigrants. Recent immigrants are the least likely to oppose further immigration. We find that these results are robust to the inclusion of socio-economic characteristics. Labour market concerns do not seem to influence views; however, financial and economic shocks are associated with anti-immigration responses.
The literature investigating the attitudes of immigrants towards immigration and determinants of immigrants' attitudes is sparse. 4 Most of the research concerning the attitudes of immigrants towards immigrants covers the US (see, for example, Binder, Polinard & Wrinkle, 1997; Hood, Morris & Shirkey, 1997; Polinard, Wrinkle & de la Garza, 1984; Sanchez & Masouka, 2010) . A recent European addition on this topic is by Just and Anderson (2015) . They use data from 5 rounds of the European Social Survey conducted 2002-2011 for 18 European countries. They explore two opposing channels of immigrants' attitudes towards immigration: (a) shared experiences, unity and ties with other immigrants and (b) integration into the host country. The former Muhammad Waqas is the corresponding author. ©2017 by De Gruyter.
Data
This paper uses three waves (Department for Communities and Local Government and Ipsos MORI 2007-2010) of the UK Citizenship Survey. 8 The survey is conducted in England and Wales, covers people aged 16 and above and consists of a core sample of around 10,000 individuals and a minority ethnic boost sample of around 5,000 individuals. For this paper respondents are categorized on the basis of country of birth of respondent and country of birth of their mother and father in order to differentiate between immigrants and natives. This classification gives us the six broad categories listed below. These classifications are subdivided on the basis of ethnicity and self-assessed nationality and are shown in Table 1. 1. Respondents born in the UK with both parents born in the UK.
2. Respondents born in the UK with one parent born abroad.
3. Respondents born in the UK with both parents born abroad.
4. Respondents born abroad with both parents born in the UK.
5. Respondents born abroad with one parent born abroad.
6. Respondents born abroad with both parents born abroad. Note: There are 304 missing values in country of birth identifiers due to unknown country of birth of the respondent, his mother or his father. 13 missing in ethnicity.
In our main specification, we focus on groups 1 and 6. We refer to the first group as "natives" and group 6 as "immigrants". While this classification may be imperfect we believe that they provide a mechanism for distinguishing between natives and immigrants. These two categories make up 85 % of the total respondents, with 55 % classed as natives and 30 % classed as immigrants. The remaining 15 % of respondents fall into one of the other four groups making it difficult to assign individuals to "natives" or "immigrants".
As robustness checks we try two different classifications: Firstly, we classify anyone born in the UK as a native (groups 1, 2 and 3) and compare these to group 6. Secondly, we divide the sample into three groups: (i) "immigrants", i. e., overseas-born individuals with at least one overseas-born parent (groups 5 and 6); (ii) "natives with immigration background", i. e., either overseas-born individuals with only UK-born parents (group 4), for example, children of British soldier families born while stationed in Germany, or, UK-born individuals with at least one overseas-born parent (groups 2 and 3); and (iii) "natives", i. e., UK-born with no foreign-born parent (group 1). We will see that our results do not depend on the exact definition of immigrants and natives that we use.
Immigrants are further divided into two categories based on the length of time they have lived in the UK. Individuals who were born overseas are asked whether they have lived in the UK for five years or more. We use this question to divide our group into earlier immigrants (five years of more in the UK) and recent immigrants (less than five years in the UK). While the categorisation of earlier and recent is data driven we believe that the five-year time horizon is important. For example, Manning and Roy (2010) show that immigrants start to change their attitudes slowly a year after their arrival into the UK, and that, subsequently, integration becomes increasingly quick. Therefore, taking 5 years as a threshold to identify earlier and recent immigrants is plausible enough to determine the heterogeneity in the attitudes of immigrants.
Our key dependent variable is the answer to the question, "Do you think the number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays should be increased, reduced or should it remain the same?" A follow-up question to respondents then asks whether the number should be increased or reduced by a little or a lot. For most of the analysis, "increased a lot", "increased a little" and "remain the same" are grouped together, as all indicate that the respondent does not want immigration to be cut. People replying "increased a lot" and "increased a little" are clearly in favour of immigration, while those replying "remain the same" also hold no opposition to further immigration. We also group the choices "reduced a lot" and "reduced a little" as both indicate a wish to see immigration reduced. Respondents selecting "cannot choose" are excluded from the analysis. This generates an indicator variable of whether an individual is opposed to further immigration.
We assess the robustness of these choices in two ways: We run ordered probit models on the original (5 category) outcome variable and we also run the same models without individuals who replied "remain the same". The results are largely unchanged.
Our data also contain information on survey year, gender, age, ethnicity, religion, practicing religion and region of residence, all of which are included as control variables. Furthermore, we also have data on employment status and income, allowing us to investigate the roles that the labour market and social status play in determining attitudes towards immigration. Control variables for all the models are the same unless mentioned. Dummy indicators are generated for all of these variables.
The omitted category for the variable survey year is "wave 2007-2008", for gender it is "male", and "London" for the regions. In terms of ethnicity, we distinguish between "White", "Black", "Subcontinent", "Chinese", "other Asian", "mixed race" and "other ethnicities". "Black" ethnicity is comprised of "Black Caribbean", "Black African" and "other black ethnicities". Subcontinent includes "Indian", "Pakistani" and "Bangladeshi" ethnicities. For the ethnicity variable "white" is the omitted category. Eight dummies are created for the religion variable and are labelled as, "Budh", "Hindu", "Jewish", "Muslim", "Christian", "Sikh", "no religion" and "other religion". "Christian" is the omitted dummy for religion. For the variable whether a person is "practicing religion or not", "not practicing religion" is considered as the reference category. "Employed" is the reference group for the employment status dummies. Income of the respondent is used to proxy for social status. The reference category for the income variable is "£10,000-£15,000".
These control variables have been included because most of the literature on attitudes uses these variables in their regressions (see, for example, Dustmann and Preston (2007) ). Although some variables that may be found in other literature on attitudes could not be included because of the data restrictions (for example data on the formal acquisition of citizenship of immigrants is not available).
Our key variable of interest is an individual's migration status. Being native serves as the reference group enabling us to explore differences between natives, earlier immigrants and recent immigrants.
One variable that we would have liked to have considered more fully is "education". However, in our data only individuals under the age of 65 are asked their educational status, limiting our analysis. We estimated models using the whole sample, omitting the education variable, and for the subset of under 65s including the available education information. The estimates of the models for the under 65s show that the coefficient of our key variable, migrant status, remained largely unchanged; however, we found that higher education is associated with favourable views towards immigration for natives, earlier and recent immigrants.
Finally, we also use the 2009/2010 data that contain additional information on economic circumstances. Four types of economic worries are considered, specifically whether the respondent has lost his/her job, experienced a drop in income, had to cutback spending on necessities such as food or shelter, or had to cutback spending on non-necessities, such as entertainment expenses or charity donations in last twelve months. The reference category for this variable is "not reporting any worry". These four additional models are estimated for the pooled sample and for natives, earlier and recent immigrants separately. These are included in separate models to consider how the onset of financial difficulties affects support for immigration. Table 2 shows that immigrants are on average younger than natives, and recent immigrants are, on average, the youngest group. Recent immigrants are more likely to be male, employed (and unemployed) and less likely to be out of the labour force than natives. Immigrants have, on average, lower incomes than natives, with recent immigrants having over a third of respondents in the lowest income group. Natives are mostly "White" by ethnicity. "Subcontinent" is the most dominant ethnicity in earlier and recent immigrants. Natives are mostly "Christian" by faith, whereas earlier immigrants are mostly "Muslim" and recent immigrants mostly "Christian".
Empirical Strategy
We begin by considering simple differences between natives, earlier and recent immigrants in their attitudes towards further immigration. These unconditional models provide a starting point for investigating differences in attitudes.
Subsequently, we control for socio-economic characteristics. The estimate of the coefficient attached to migrant status is now purged of observable differences in characteristics. This step enables us to see whether differences in socio-economic variables, such as labour market status, economic situation, or cultural background variables, such as religion, are responsible for the observed differences between natives and the various immigrant groups. It is difficult to make claims of causality with regards to these variables as at least some of them, such as practicing a religion, might very well be correlated with unobservables that also matter for a respondent's views on immigration policy.
Unless mentioned, our estimating equation for all the models is
where Y is the outcome variable, α is the intercept, β is the coefficient vector for our key dummy variable I that indicates the migration status of the respondent, γ is the coefficient vector for the key independent variables (X), ζ is the coefficient vector for our additional controls such as regional dummies and age contained in Z, and ε represents the error term.
Our key interest lies in the estimation of the β, coefficients attached to dummy variables indicating whether an individual is a native (the omitted category), an earlier immigrant, or a recent immigrant. Also of interest are coefficients on variables describing a respondent's labour market outcomes and economic status, as there is a strong public perception that opposition to immigration is primarily driven by labour market concerns.
We estimate our models using OLS, probit and ordered probit regressions to account for the binary nature of our main dichotomised outcome, as well as the ordinal nature of the underlying variable. For further analysis, we employ a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) to decompose the mean differences of the determinants of attitudes towards immigration for natives, earlier immigrants and recent immigrants, taken in pairs. The decomposition allows us to further investigate whether attitudes towards immigration are determined by differences in endowments, i. e., differences in the characteristics of natives and immigrants, or coefficients, i. e., the partial correlations between these characteristics and the outcome.
There are two reasons why the results should be seen as more descriptive than causal. Firstly, there may be unobservable characteristics, such as productivity or cultural upbringing, which contribute to views on immigration that may differ systematically between our groups. While we can use observable characteristics to overcome some of these problems, such as using education in the under 65-sample as a proxy for productivity, these are still imperfect controls.
Secondly, there are two potential sample selection problems as well. The first arises because some natives, who might be pro-immigration, may migrate abroad, meaning that they will not appear in the survey, potentially leading to an over-estimate of negative views towards immigration.
The second, and more important problem, relates to sample selection among immigrants. While our observation of recent immigrants may be largely representative of the population who have arrived in Great Britain, the same is not true of our earlier immigrant population. The problem we face is that some of the immigrants who initially arrived in Britain will return home or venture to other countries. The reasons for leaving can be diverse, although the most likely are that the period of work in Britain came to an end (or they found another job elsewhere), or that they did not find what they were looking for and decided to leave. Such behaviours mean that composition of recent immigrants might well be subtly different from that of earlier immigrants, leading to some issues when trying to generalise our results to the wider (future) population.
Results
Panel A of Table 3 gives the results from the unconditional and conditional models for our preferred definition of immigrant and natives. The conditional models include controls for employment status, income level, age dummies, ethnicity, gender, religion, wave year and Government Office Region of residence. All models suggest that both immigrant groups are less opposed to further immigration than natives. Furthermore, the estimates for earlier immigrants are always closer to zero than the estimates for recent immigrants. Quantitatively, the unconditional models suggest that earlier immigrants are between 26 and 29 percentage points less likely to oppose immigration than natives, while the corresponding numbers for recent immigrants are between 41 and 49 percentage points. The coefficients are economically large and highly significant. 0.248* (0.018) * Notes: Conditional models control for employment status, wave year, age dummies, ethnicity, religion, practising religion or not, income, and region. Omitted category for migrant status dummy is "natives". Significance levels: *10 %, **5 %, ***1 %. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
We obtain a similar pattern of results when using an ordered probit. In the conditional models, the estimates are nearly halved for all models. Earlier immigrants are now between 12 and 13 percentage points less likely to oppose further immigration than natives, while recent immigrants are between 24 and 30 percentage points less likely, as presented in column (5) and (6) of Table 3 . However, the differences between the three groups remain large and statistically significant.
The bottom panel of Table 3 presents estimates for a model, without a constant, that includes dummies for natives, earlier and recent immigrants. In the unconditional models, the estimates correspond to the fraction of respondents in each of the groups who are opposed to further immigration. In the conditional models, these dummies can be interpreted as residual differences after the effects of the other observable variables have been taken out. Including these reduces the residual share of respondents who are opposed to immigration in each group. Residual shares are still large, however, suggesting that the opposition to immigration is not just driven by the included RHS variables. The results for earlier immigrants are between those of natives and recent immigrants. We conduct F-tests to check for the equality of the coefficients and find that the coefficients of the three groups are significantly different from each other. Additionally, confidence intervals around the coefficients from the three groups do not overlap, again suggesting a significant difference. From these results, it is clear that support for further immigration differs widely between the three groups and that earlier immigrants hold views that, on average, fall between the views of natives and recent immigrants. Table 4 explores the impact of using alternative definitions of immigrants or natives as described in Section 2, again for conditional and unconditional models. Columns (1) and (2) are replicated from Table 3 , while columns (3) and (4) and (5) and (6) rely on alternative definitions. As we can see the results are fairly independent of these choices. (1) and (2): Natives are individuals born in the UK to UK-born parents (base category). Immigrants are foreign-born individuals with foreign born parents.Columns (3) and (4): Natives are individuals born in the UK regardless of parents' birth (base category). Immigrants are foreign-born individuals with foreign born parents.Columns (5) and (6): Natives are individuals born in the UK to UK-born parents (base category). Natives with immigration background are either individuals born in the UK with at least one parent born outside of the UK or overseas-born individuals whose parents were both born in the UK. Immigrants are all foreign-born individual, regardless of parents' birth.***Controls are identical to those used in Table 3 . Significance levels: *10 %, **5 %, ***1 %. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
In Table 5 , we present separate models for natives, earlier and recent immigrants. These suggest that, by and large, and with the exception of earlier immigrants who are out of the labour force, none of the labour market dummies are significant. It is interesting to note that the significant coefficient for "out of the labour force" suggests that these respondents are, if anything, more in favour of further immigration than employed respondents. Based on these results, it appears that labour market status is largely unrelated to anti-immigration views for any of the groups. These findings are in line with the findings of Dustmann and Preston (2007) and Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2012) who also find that labour market concerns are not important in determining natives' views towards immigration. Furthermore, a range of studies find that welfare concerns or non-economic concerns, such as a loss of identity are more important than the labour market concerns. 0.065 0.075 0.059 * Notes: All models control for: wave year, age dummies, and region. Omitted category for migrant status, employment status, income dummies, ethnicity, religion and practising religion is natives, employed and income 10K to 15K, white, Christian, and not practising religion respectively.Significance levels: *10 %, **5 %, ***1 %. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
Income dummies are used to analyse the impact of economic status on opposition to further immigration. It is interesting to note that for natives and earlier immigrants a clear gradient emerges, presented in Figure  1 . Natives and immigrants with higher income are more likely to be in support of further immigration. For recent immigrants the pattern appears to be less clear. Relative to individuals earning between £10k and £15k, individuals with lower incomes are between 8 and 1 percentage points less likely to oppose immigration, while respondents with higher income are also less opposed towards further immigration, resulting in an inverted Ushaped relationship between income and opposition to immigration. Potential explanations for this somewhat unexpected result at low incomes could be the role of non-monetary motives such as family reunification, or the desire for individuals to see more immigration from their home country, which may be stronger for recent immigrants than for earlier immigrants. In terms of the other control variables, Table 5 suggests some gender differences among the two immigrant groups but not among natives. There are also some differences across the various ethnic groups.
10 While difficult to interpret, these could principally point towards differences by region or country of origin. Finally, the religion dummies suggest that more sympathy towards further immigration among non-Christian faiths.
Finally, we look at the effect of economic shocks experienced in the previous year. Our results, shown in Table  6 , suggest that experience in the previous period of a job loss, a drop in income, having to cut back expenses or having to cut back expenses on both necessities and luxuries are associated with a stronger opposition to further immigration, even when controlling for current circumstances (see, Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun (2013) for similar findings). All models control for: wave year, age dummies, and region. Omitted category for financial worry dummies is "not reporting any worry". * * Significance levels: *10 %, **5 %, ***1 %.Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
For natives, job loss is associated with a 4 percentage points increase in opposition to further immigration, while drops in income and cutbacks in necessities are associated with a 2 percentage points increase. For earlier immigrants, drops in income and cutbacks in luxuries appear to matter most, while job loss and cutbacks in necessities appear to be less important. Finally, the point estimates for recent immigrants suggest that they react more strongly to job losses, drops in income and, in particular, cutbacks in necessities than the other groups. These results suggest that changes in economic status in earlier periods, such as drops in income or job loss, matter for people's views on immigration, even when holding the current levels of these variables constant.
On the whole, our results support our earlier suggestion that earlier immigrants appear to hold views closer to those of natives than to recent immigrants. 11 Table 7 presents the results from Blinder-Oaxaca-decompositions for the various group pairings, (a) natives and earlier immigrants, (b) natives and recent immigrants and (c) earlier immigrants and recent immigrants. The mean difference in the fraction of respondents who are opposed to immigration between the earlier mentioned three groups (a), (b) and (c) is 29.2, 48.8 and 19.6 percentage points, with a 1 % level of significance. The "endowments effect" is only significant for comparison (a) with a point estimate of 11.2, suggesting that about 40 % of the differential can be explained by differences in characteristics. For comparisons (b) and (c) only the "coefficients effect" is significant, with point estimates of 28.3 and 20.1 percentage points. It shows that the recent immigrants would be 28.3 (20.1) percentage points more opposed to immigration if the coefficients of natives (earlier immigrants) were applied to recent immigrants' characteristics. These results suggest that for these comparisons it is not differences in the characteristics between the groups that matters but the fact that the marginal effects are different. The fact that the results are similar when comparing both natives and earlier immigrants to recent immigrants again confirms the view that natives and earlier immigrants are increasingly similar. 0.001 (0.008) * Notes: All models control for: gender, employment status, ethnicity, religion, practising religion or not, income, wave year and region. Significance levels: *10 %, **5 %, ***1 %. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
Discussion and Conclusion
Much of the empirical literature has focused on the impact of immigration on local labour markets.
12 The literature investigating the views of natives towards further immigration is also growing rapidly. Whereas, views of immigrants towards immigration have gained little attention. This paper is a new addition to the sparse literature investigating how immigrants view further immigration, and how these views may vary between natives, earlier and more recent immigrants. The main finding of this research is that there is heterogeneity in the attitudes of immigrants towards immigration, with recent immigrants being less opposed to immigration than earlier immigrants.
The results for earlier immigrants consistently lie between those of natives and recent immigrants. There are essentially two explanations why earlier immigrants are more similar to natives than recent ones. The first is that as time passes immigrants integrate into British society. Secondly, it could be the case that only those immigrants who are similar to natives stay in the country, while other immigrants, with differing views, leave. The first explanation is supported by the findings of Manning and Roy (2010) concerning cultural assimilation; immigrants appear to become more similar to natives the longer they have been in the country (see also, Gordon, 1964; Heath et al., 2013) . Manning and Roy (2010) find that immigrants integrate into the British culture very easily.
The second explanation is essentially self-selection but the limited available information in the data, in particular the fact that we do not observe immigrants who have left, does not allow this to be tested. It could also be the case that people who left the UK in fact did not want to leave the UK but they had to leave because of the visa restrictions.
This study does not find any strong consistent evidence that the anti-immigration views of natives, earlier and recent immigrants towards further immigration can be attributed to labour market outcomes. Even if the earlier immigrants and recent immigrants compete in the labour market, as suggested by the findings of Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013) , there is no strong evidence that the current employment status affects views towards further immigration.
Results regarding the income of natives and earlier immigrants suggest a clear gradient for respondents, with higher income favouring further immigration, whereas there is some evidence for an inverted U-shape for recent immigrants. A potential explanation for this result is that low-income recent immigrants may have concerns that family reunification may be made harder by tougher immigration laws, and these worries may overwhelm other concerns.
We further find evidence in all three groups that economic shocks, such as job loss or drops in income in a previous period matter, even when holding current employment status and the level of income constant. This finding is in line with the previous literature (see, for example, Gang, Rivera-Batiz & Yun, 2013; and MalchowMoller et al. 2008 ). This result suggests that people might be blaming immigrants for adverse shocks, regardless of whether they recover from the respective shock.
Overall, this research suggests (a) that earlier immigrants and natives share more similar views towards further immigration than earlier and recent immigrants, (b) that employment status does not play a large role in explaining anti-immigration views, (c) income matters, even though the exact effects differ at low incomes between recent immigrants, natives and earlier immigrants, and (d) that economic shocks tend to be associated with more anti-immigration views.
These results are important in helping us understand some of the drivers behind anti-immigration views -which played a large role both in the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership and the 2016 US presidential election. Importantly, the fact that both earlier and more recent immigrants also oppose further immigration, although to a lesser extent than natives, suggests that this opposition cannot simply be explained as xenophobia.
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